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POVERTY ALLEVIATION POLICIES IN INDIA: FOOD CONSUMPTION SUBSIDY, 
FOOD PRODUCTION SUBSIDY AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATION 
Abstract 
Poverty alleviation has been the overarching objective of the development 
strategy of India since independence, although achievements have fallen far 
short of expectations. Over time a number of targeted and non-targeted 
poverty alleviation policies of varying extent of coverage and efficiency have 
been tried. The paper compares the effectiveness of some of these policy 
interventions in alleviating poverty using counter-factual policy simulations 
with a sequential applied general equilibrium model of the Indian economy for 
the period 1980-2000. Specifically the simulated policies include 
(i) abolishing the existing subsidized public distribution of a specified 
amount of foodgrains to all urban residents or alternatively extending it to 
the rural areas and making it completely free, 
(ii) the introduction of a rural works programs (RWP) targeted at the 
poorest groups of varying efficiency in its design and execution as well as 
its success in targeting, 
(iii) abolition of the existing fertiliser subsidy and the use of part of 
the resources saved for augmenting aggregate investment and the remaining 
spent either on a rural works programme or on creating additional irrigated 
area. 
The results suggest that a well designed, executed and targeted RWP has 
the greatest impact in alleviating poverty. 
POVERTY ALLEVIATION POLICIES IN INDIA: FOOD CONSUMPTION SUBSIDY, 
FOOD PRODUCTION SUBSIDY AND EMPLOYMENT GENERATION 
1. Introduction 
The Directive Principles of State Policy as enshrined in the Indian 
constitution (Basu (1983)) enjoin the state to strive to secure "a social 
order in which justice, social, economic and political shall inform all the 
institutions of national life" and "to minimize inequality in income, status, 
facilities and opportunities, amongst individuals and groups" (Article 38), 
and to ensure "that the ownership and control of the material resources of the 
community are so distributed as best to subscribe the common good; that the 
operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of 
wealth and means of production to the common detriment" (Article 39). Article 
41 seeks to make effective provision for securing the right to work, to educa­
tion and public assistance in cases of unemployment, disability, sickness etc. 
The strong egalitarian and redistributive thrust of these principles is 
evident. The government resolution establishing in Planning Commission in 
1950 explicitly invoked these principles and the very first Five Year Plan set 
out the task of development as to "translate the goals of social and 
economic policy prescribed in the Directive Principles of the Constitution 
into a national programme based upon the assessment of needs and resources" 
(as quoted in Draft Sixth Five Year Plan 1979-83). 
It should also be stressed that from the early days of planning concerns 
were expressed that benefits of growth may not be equitably shared. We can do 
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no better than to quote from a speech given by Prime Minister Nehru in the 
Parliament in 1960 while introducing the Third Five Year Plan: 
" ... it is said that the national income over the 
First and Second Plans has gone up by 42 per cent and 
the per capita income by 20 per cent. A legitimate 
query is made where has this gone? It is a very 
legitimate query; to some extent of course, you can 
see where it has gone. I sometimes do address large 
gatherings in the villages and I can see that they 
are better-fed and better-clothed, they build brick 
houses ..... Nevertheless, this does not apply to 
everybody in India. Some people probably have hardly 
benefited. Some people may even be facing various 
difficulties. The fact remains, however, that this 
advance in our national income, in our per cpaita 
income has taken place, and I think it is desirable 
that we should enquire more deeply as to where this 
has gone and appoint some expert committee to enquire 
into how exactly this additional income that has come 
to the country or per capita has spread." 
The concern that the growth process may have been unequalizing led Nehru's 
government to appoint a committee in 1960 under the Chairmanship of Professor 
P. C. Mahalanobis to study the distribution of income and levels of living in 
India. Even before this committee submitted its report in 1964, Mr. ~itambar 
Pant, then the head of the Perspective Planning Division of the Planning 
Commission, prepared a paper in 1962 (Srinivasan and Bardhan (1974), ch. 1) 
outlining a fifteen year perspective plan whose objective was to assure a 
minimum level of living for the entire Indian population by 1976. He argued 
that "the central concern of our planning has to be the removal of poverty as 
early as possible. The stage has now come when we should sharply focus our 
efforts on providing an assured minimum income to every citizen of the country 
within a reasonable period of time. Progressively the minimum itself should 
be raised as development goes a pace." This paper defined a minimum standard 
of living i.e. a poverty line, which has formed the basis of all discussion 
about poverty in India since then in the form of a minimum monthly per capita 
household private consumption expenditure, while explicitly excluding 
"expenditure on health and education, both of which are expected to be 
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provided by the State." 
Pant rejected massive redistribution as "operationally meaningless unless 
revolutionary changes in property rights and scale and structure of wages and 
compensation are contemplated." He argued that rapid growth is vital for 
poverty alleviation since "a comparison of distribution of incomes in 
different countries ... at very different levels of development and with varying 
socio-political environments ... follows a remarkably similar pattern, 
especially in respect to the proportion of incomes earned by the lowest three 
or four deciles of the population." However he recognized that "on account of 
certain peculiarities of the Indian economy, it is, however, uncertain whether 
the distribution of income will remain stable with development or how it will 
change." Indeed, the paper specifically drew attention to the fact that in 
the Indian economy, the poor living in remote areas and belonging to the vast 
reserve of under-employed labour in rural areas (comprising landless labour, 
cultivators with very small holdings, artisans with primitive techniques) with 
limited mobility (across space and occupations) were loosely integrated with 
the growing sectors of the economy and that economic development in itself was 
unlikely to lift them out of their poverty. For them income transfers were 
seen as needed. Taking all these into consideration the paper arrived at a 
growth target of 7% per annum by balancing what is desirable with what is 
feasible by way of rate of growth and income redistribution within a given 
period of time. 
In the event, the perspective plan presented in Pant's paper was not 
adopted. Until Mrs. Gandhi raised elimination of poverty as the main plank of 
her electoral platform in 1971, the planning commission did not formally 
propose a poverty oriented component of five year plans. They did so with the 
Fifth Five Year Plan for the period 1974-79. 
The approach to the Fifth Plan postulated a specific objective of poverty 
eradication along with the elimination of net external aid on concessional 
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terms, neither of which has been attained to this day! It included a "minimum 
needs" component which was an updated version of the notion of minimum levels 
of living of the Pant paper which itself anticipated the few worthwhile 
elements of the late, but not so lamented, Basic Needs approach proclaimed by 
some international agencies. The Sixth Plan (1979-84) included a number of 
poverty eradication measures such as programmes for rural works and 
self-employment and schemes for increasing the productivity of small and 
marginal farmers and rural artisans. The urban poor had always been 
beneficiaries of the public food distribution system under which a specified 
quantum of food grains and a few other basic items of consumption were 
supplied to all urban residents at a subsidized price. This was a legacy of 
the food rationing system introduced by the colonial government during the 
war. The supplies for the distribution system were obtained in part from 
imports and in part from domestic procurement at prices which were, until a 
few years ago, considerably below open market prices. Besides the policy of 
procurement and public distribution, various policies to encourage production 
through the adoption of the cultivation of high yielding fertiliser responsive 
varieties were introduced. These were mainly in the form of subsidies on the 
purchase of agricultural inputs such as fertiliser, fuel and power as well as 
water from public irrigation systems. It was believed that such policies 
alleviated poverty, on the one hand by improving the productivity and incomes 
of small farmers, and inducing an outward shift in the demand for agricultural 
labour, and on the other, by moderating any increase in the price of food 
because of outward shifts in the demand for food due to increases in real 
incomes. Subsidized credit was made available for working capital as well as 
for investment in irrigation (tubewells and energised dug wells) and farm 
equipment. We propose to compare the effectiveness of some of these policy 
interventions in alleviating poverty. Before describing the analytical 
framework of an applied general equilibrium model used for this comparison, 
some general considerations that led to that choice are worth describing. 
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2. The Rationale for and the Basic Features of an Applied General Equilibrium 
Model 
In a mixed economy such as India's in which market transactions are 
dominant, the welfare of an individual depends on the quantities and prices of 
the goods and factor services she sells (or buys) in the market as well as on 
any income transfers she receives from others including the government. In 
particular, government fiscal policies (other than income transfer policies) 
affect the welfare of all individuals including the poor through their direct 
effects on the prices they face and the incomes they earn. Of course, income 
tarnsfer policies also affect prices indirectly through their effects on 
demand. 
It is self evident that in an economy with a fairly complex structure such 
as India's, any economic policy is likely to affect market prices and hence 
will have an impct on the welfare of the poor, although for many policies this 
impact is likely to be negligible. Of course policies that are explicitly 
targeted at the poor, in principle, can be expected to have significant 
effects. It is unlikely that governments have a single well defined objective 
such as poverty alleviation and choose a mutually consistent set of policies 
towards achieving that objective. It is much more likely that they have 
several objectives and choose policies that promote some objectives further 
than others, if not at their expense. The combined effect of the mix of 
policies, on the economy in general and the poor in particular is sometimes 
difficult, if not impossible, to assess without an empirical model that 
incorporates the important feed-back effects. 
No real economy is likely to remain in a static or steady state 
equilibrium. As such dynamic or inter-temporal effects of policies are 
important. An oft discussed trade-off, mistakenly described by some as 
between growth and equity, is in fact between more equity (or less poverty) in 
the present and less equity (or more poverty) than otherwise in the future 
through policies that finance present poverty alleviation through reductions 
in growth promoting investments. For example, the resources used in 
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subsidizing the food consumption of the poor, if invested in increasing the 
quantum as well as productivity of assets owned by the poor, will obviously 
hurt the welfare of the poor in the present while improving their incomes in 
the future. These considerations suggest that the analytical framework must 
be capable of evaluating the combined effects of several policy interventions 
on different socio-economic groups over time. A natural framework satisfying 
these desiderata is the dynamic applied general equilibrum model. 
An applied general equilibrium model that is Walrasian in spirit assumes 
that all agents recognized in the model behave rationally, i.e. each has a 
consistent set of preferences over the outcomes of his or her actions and 
chooses that action which has the most preferred outcome among all feasible 
actions. Typically, a consumer's preferences are assumed to be represented by 
a utility function whose argument is the vector of his consumption of various 
goods and services. An action as well as its outcome is a particular choice 
of the consumption vector. And the feasible set of actions is simply those 
within his budget, i.e. it is the set of all consumption vectors that cost no 
more at the prices he faces (over which he is assumed to have no influence) 
than the value of his endowment of commodities and factors and his share of 
the net profits of firms. In principle, the utility function and the budget 
constraint can extend over several periods of time, thereby incorporating the 
consumer's saving and portfolio choices. Consumer choices, aggregated over 
all consumers, yield the consumer demand for commodities, supplies of factor 
services and demand for equities and debentures in firms. A firm's action is 
a vector of outputs it produces and inputs it purchases. Feasible action 
vectors are those that the technology available to the firm for transforming 
inputs into outputs permits. This set is the firm's production set. Firms 
are assumed to maximize net revenue, i.e. the difference between the value of 
output and the cost of inputs at the prices they face over their production 
sets. Firm choices, aggregated over all firms, result in the supply of goods 
and demand for factors. Once again, by defining actions as extending over 
several periods, investment activities can be accommodated, with the finance 
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for investment arising from sale of equities and issue of debentures. The 
price vectors that ensure that markets for goods, factors and equities clear 
is an equilibrium price vector. Government is most naturally modeled in this 
set up as an agent who sets commodity and factor taxes, tariffs, etc. makes 
transfers and supplies some goods and services and demands others. Its 
expenditures are restricted to what it can finance through tax revenues and 
borrowing from the public at home and abroad. Although real world governments 
also have the option of using the inflation tax mechanism of fiat money 
creation for financing their expenditures, there is no theoretically 
satisfactory way of introducing it in a 'real' model of the Walrasian genre. 
Of course, the market clearance requirement will take into account government 
demands and supplies as well. 
It is clear that the task of empirically specifying such a model is 
'demanding in terms of data, the need for specifying functional forms for 
utility functions, production functions etc as well as requiring estimates of 
the relevant parameters. And it will inevitably involve making compromises 
that are unsatisfactory from a theoretical perspective but dictated by the 
available data and econometric knowledge. Nevertheless, this framework or 
something akin to it is absolutely essential if the various feed back effects 
of several policies are to be analyzed consistently. Above all it ensures 
that there are no hidden sources for meeting excess demand or blackholes into 
which excess supplies disappear, subsidies have to be financed, tax revenues 
have to be spent etc. For example, it will require that the introduction of, 
say, a subsidy on the food consumption of the poor, is accompanied by a 
specification of the mode of its financing so that both the direct impact of 
the subsidy on the welfare of the poor and the indirect impact arising out of 
the particular way in which it is financed are fully reflected in the 
equilibrium. 
Section 2 briefly describes the features of our applied general 
equilibrium model of the Indian economy, its strengths and weaknesses. 
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Section 3 is devoted to the specification of reference and policy scenarios 
for simulation. Section 4 presents the simulation results. Section 5 
concludes the paper drawing out the policy implications of the results. 
3. Features of the Applied General Equilibrium Model for India 
The analytical model is of the sequential applied general equilibrium 
(AGE) genre in which an equilibrium price vector is computed for each year in 
succession. Unlike other such models, a number of behavioural functions 
relating to demand and supply have been econometrically estimated with data 
mostly from the period 1950-51 to 1973-75. In the running of the model, for 
the period up to 1980, outputs, imports and exports were set equal to their 
actual values, and the actually observed prices were generated as equilibrium 
prices by ensuring market clearance at these prices through stock accumulation 
or decumulation. Indeed, the fact that such a procedure did not lead to 
implausible values of changes in stocks was viewed as a validation of the 
model. The period after 1980 was the simulation period. Great simplication 
was achieved by imposing a one-year lag between production and market sale. 
Thus, in effect the economy became an exchange economy for the purposes of 
computing equilibrium prices. 
The economy is divided into ten sectors, of which the first nine produce 
agricultural commodities and the tenth produces the only non-agricultural 
good.l There are three sets of agents: producers, consumers, and government. 
Consumers are classified by their residence as rural or urban. Rural as well 
as urban consumers are divided into five expenditure classes each according to 
their monthly per capita household consumption expenditure. Means of 
production (capital), natural resources (land), human resources (labor), and 
livestock (draft and milch animals; poultry, etc.) generate income through 
production activities that is distributed to consumers. Thus, 
1The nine agricultural commodities are rice, wheat, coarse grains, bovine 
and ovine meats, dairy products, other animal products, protein feeds, other 
food, and non-food agriculture. 
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behaviour of producers (i.e., their production activities) determines 
commodity supplies and incomes. Consumer behaviour generates commodity 
demands (and implicitly resource supplies). The government sets policies 
(e.g., investment targets, taxes, tariffs, quotas, rations, price supports and 
ceilings, etc.). Finally, equilibrium is achieved through exchange in which 
domestic demands, together with export demand by the rest of the world for 
each sector's output, is equated to the sum of domestic supply (emerging from 
previous year's production net of changes in stocks) and (foreign) import 
supply. 
Per capita consumer demand of each of ten classes of consumers for the 
output of each sector is modeled as a Stone-Geary linear expenditure system. 
The growth of total population and number of households (rural and urban) is 
exogenously specified. The joint distribution of households according to 
their per capita income and consumption expenditure was assumed to be 
log-normal in each period. However the mgfil} of the marginal distribution of 
logarithm of per capita income was allowed to over time with the growth of 
income. Other parameters such as the variances, the correlation coefficient 
and the intercept of the linear regression of logarithm of per capita 
consumption on per capita income of the household were assumed to remain 
constant at their estimated values from 1976 data. This meant that the mgfil} 
of the conditional distribution of (the logarithm of) per capita household 
consumption varied linearly with the mean of logarithm of per capita household 
income. Thus, the relevant population of households falling within each of 
the ten expenditure classes as well as their mean per capita consumption 
expenditure could be determined for each year given aggregate consumer income 
for that year. The difference between income and consumption expenditure 
represents household savings. 
Admittedly, the above distributional assumptions, including in particular 
the assumption that only the means of the logarithm per capita household 
income (and consumption) vary over time, are strong. They imply that the 
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concentration of the marginal distributions of logarithms of income and 
consumption do not change. A more satisfactory procedure would have been to 
specify an initial distribution of factor endowments and derive the changes in 
factor endowments from one period to the next as well as the savings in each 
period from an intertemporal optimization procedure, given appropraite 
assumptions about expectations regarding the path of factor prices including 
returns on assets. It goes without saying that implementing such a procedure 
is beyond the reach of modelers of even developed countries with more 
extensive data bases and econometric studies on savings, investment and 
fertility behaviour of households. Indeed modelers most often ignore 
distributional issues altogether by assuming that the society consists of a 
single household or alternatively avoiding dynamics by concentrating on static 
distributional effects. Given our interest is in dynamics, our strong 
assumption has an operational justification that it enables us to derive the 
dynamic distributional effects in a relatively easy way. It is also 
consistent with econometric studies showing that a log normal distribution 
fits the data from the various rounds of the national sample survey on the 
distribution of households according to per capita private consumption 
expenditure. 
Public consumption is assumed to be a constant proportion of GDP and it is 
spent entirely on non-agricultural goods. The proportion of aggregate 
investment in GDP is exogenously specified. Income tax rates adjust so as to 
generate enough public savings (revenues minus consumption) which, together 
with household savings and exogenously specified foreign capital inflow, will 
equal aggregate investment. The share of agricultural investment in aggregate 
investment is a function of the relative price of agricultural goods. 
Agricultural investment influences the total gross cropped area as well as the 
irrigated portion of it. A detailed model of allocation of area among crops, 
choice of varieties to be cultivated (high yielding and traditional), 
a version of Nerlovian adaptive expectationsfertiliser intensity based on 
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framework determine the vector of crop outputs. Capital is the only factor 
used in the production of the non-agricultural good. Capital stock in this 
sector is updated by net investment. Thus, the value of outputs of 
agriculture and non-agriculture together net of taxes and transfers determine 
the income available to consumers. 
The complete algebraic description of the model and its numerical version 
are available in Narayana et al (1987a). A more concise description is 
available in Narayana et al (1987b). It should be pointed out that the two 
major weaknesses of the model are the absence of a labour market and the 
extreme aggregation of all non-agricultural goods into one. By the absence of 
a labour market we mean first, that labour is not formally treated as a factor 
of production in any of the ten sectors that a demand function for labour (let 
alone for labour distinguished by age, sex, residence and skill) cannot be 
derived from producer behaviour, given the structure of wage rates, product 
prices etc. Second, in the household utility function leisure does not enter 
nor does the value of labour endowment explicitly enter the household budget 
constraint. Thus a labour supply function cannot be derived from household 
behaviour. With both demand and supply functions absent, deriving an 
equilibirum wage rate for each period is ruled out. There is no capital or 
land market in the model in the model so that the only real choices of 
agricultural producers are the allocation of available land (irrigated and 
unirrigated) to crops (and varieties of crops), and the amount of fertilisers 
to use. Non-agricultural producers can choose the rate of capacity 
utilization. In short, only value added is endogenously derived in the model 
and not its allocation between factors. However this does not preclude an 
analysis of distributional effects since the joint distribution of household 
income (which is obtained from value added) and consumption is specified 
directly. The major reason for not introducing an explicit labour market is 
the lack of satisfactory studies of labor supply and demand. After all, even 
in developed countries robust estimates of labour supply elasticities are 
scarce! 
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One could interpret the absence of an explicit labour market as implying 
that an infinitely elastic labour supply at some real wage is being assumed. 
But such an interpretation has no operational significance for most of the 
analysis except the simulations which involve rural works. In these scenarios 
it is assumed that enough labour will find it attractive to be employed in 
rural works programmes offering an exogenously set fixed real wage that is 
constant over a twenty year period. It is impossible to say whether this is 
too strong an assumption without a well specified labour market that 
realistically describes rural India. On the other hand, given the actual 
rural labour market environment, if indeed not enough labour will be 
forthcoming (i.e. there will be an excess demand for labour at the offered 
wage), to that extent the scale of rural works programmes could be reduced 
without affecting the extent of poverty alleviation. It is argued that 
because of the self-targeting nature of rural works employment, only those 
with relatively low reservation wages and capacity for physical work (eg. 
women, children and elderly) will be attracted to the programme and to the 
extent, physical effort determines the capacity and durability of roads or 
irrigation canals constructed with their labour, the quality of such assets 
may suffer. But the complexity of the relationship between food energy intake 
and expenditure of energy in work-effort precludes any firm conclusion. There 
are no carefully designed empirical studies available to base one's judgment 
on this issue. 
The assumption that all goods are internationally traded precludes the 
analysis of the role of nontraded goods, particularly infrastructural goods in 
the development of the Indian economy. The model is better viewed as 
computing a sequence of temporary equilibria rather than a full blown 
intertemporal equilibrium. In particular strong assumptions on preferences 
are needed to ensure the intertemporal optimality of the household savings 
behaviour incorporated in the model. The specification that the proportion of 
aggregate investment in GDP is a function only of time also violates the 
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spirit of models of intertemporal equilibrium. Almost all applied general 
equilibrium including ours ignore considerations of political economy. The 
assumption that government policy is set exogenously and agents respond to the 
policy as if they have no influence in its formulation is extreme. In fact, 
lobbies form and spend resources in getting policies favoured by them enacted 
or to appropriate the benefits of policies in place. These considerations 
which form the core of the literature on neo-classical political economy are 
if the model is broadened toabsent from our model. On the other hand, 
roomgenerate a politico-economic general equilibrium there will be no for 
policy change by definition. Only a comparative static analysis is possible 
with respect to changes in those exogenous variables that determine both 
equilibrium policies and economic variables! 
4. The Reference and Policy Scenarios 
The role of the reference scenario is to serve as a benchmark for 
comparison with scenarios in which one or more policies are changed from their 
reference specification. It should be kept in mind that the model is not a 
areforecasting model--all the scenarios including the reference scenario 
of this genre, incounterfactual simulations. Although, unlike many models 
our model values of most of the parameters are econometrically estimated, 
still several were indeed exogenously specified. It is our contention that 
any alternative specification of values of these parameters will change both 
the reference and policy scenarios in a similar way so that the impact of 
policies expressed as changes relative to the reference scenario would be the 
same whichever set of parameter values were used. In a way, this is more an 
article of faith than an analytically or empirically established fact. It is 
convenient to have as the reference scenario one in which essentially the 
relevant policy regimes remain unchanged in the simulation period as compared 
to the pre-simulation period. 
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The more important assumptions and policies in the reference scenario are: 
(i) The public distribution system for urban areas: the quantity of 
foodgrains distributed in any year as a sµare of net output of foodgrains is a 
nonlinear function of the level and the change over the previous year of net 
output per capita and real non-agricultural income per capita subject to a 
ceiling of 135 kgs. per urban resident. Historically a maximum of little over 
150 kgs. per urban resident was distributed in the severe drought year of 
1966. The price subsidy on publicly distributed grain is 20%. (However the 
subsidy is 3.0% according to 1989-90 budget.) The quantity of foodgrains 
purchased below market prices was in general related to output and the ratio 
of procurement price relative to expected open market prices. 
(ii) Quantitative restrictions on the net foreign trade of different 
agricultural commodities range from 5% to 15% of domestic supply (i.e. 
production plus initial stocks). 
(iii) Foreign trade deficit is set at 1.5% of GDP. 
(iv) Domestic price policy interventions steer the domestic market prices 
gradually towards exogenously specified world prices, i.e. gradual 
liberalization of markets is postulated. 
(v) Total population grows by 2.26% per year from its value of 674 
million in year 1980 to 1048 million in year 2000. The proportion of urban 
population in the total rises from 23% in 1950 to 31.5% in 2000. 
(vi) Aggregate (public plus private) investment as a proportion of GDP 
was assumed to be a monotone function of time with an asymptote of 0.45. 
The counterfactual policy scenarios that we consider are: 
(i) Variations in the public distribution system ranging from its 
abolition to its extension to rural areas and making food rations free (i.e. 
100% subsidy). 
(ii) A rural works programme targeted at the bottom two classes with 
alternative assumptions regarding the efficiency of its design and execution 
as well as success in targeting. 
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(iii) Abolition of the fertiliser subsidy and the use of part of the 
resources saved for augmenting aggregate investment and the remaining spent 
either on a rural works programme or on creating additional irrigated area. 
Table 1 provides some recent data on the extent of subsidies relating to 
fertilizer and food distribution from the Central government budget. In 
1988-89 these two amounted to Rs. 56 billion. We should add to this figure 
the budgetary support implicit in water charges and electricity tariffs. Just 
charging operating costs (let alone capital charges) would have put at least 
40 billion more in the hands of central and state governments. The total loss 
to government budgets was around Rs. 96 billion in 1988-89. The total 
expenditure of the central government in 1988-89 was Rs. 758 billion (revised 
estimate) and that of the states was Rs. 542 billion (budget estiamte), The 
above four subsidies account roughly for 12.5% of central budget and 7.5% of 
the budget of the centre and states together. 
5. Simulation Results 
The welfare impact of alternative policies can be seen by comparing the 
distribution of population according to their equivalent expenditures (i.e. 
consumption expenditure needed to achieve the welfare achieved under the 
policy if consumers were to face 1970 prices). Since the average equivalent 
expenditure within each class as well as the proportion of population in the 
class can vary among policy scenarios, for an overall comparison we adapt the 
approach of Willig and Bailey (1981). They show that, given a population of 
individuals ranked from 1 ton according to their equivalent expenditures, 
1 2 
m ~i and m ~i' in two distributions (i.e., mj~i the expenditure that a 
person i needs at some base price pO to achieve the same welfare that he 
enjoys at prices pj and nominal income yj in distribution j, j 1.2), the 
first distribution is preferred to the second according to any social welfare 
function that satisfies the Pareto principle, anonymity, and aversion to 
regressive transfer if and only if 
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k k1 2 
m. m. for k 1,2, ... ,n.~ > ~ ]. ].
i 1 i 1 
It should be noted that person i (i.e., the one having the ith lowest 
equivalent expenditure) in distribution 1 need not be the same as person i in 
distribution 2. As the authors point out, the above inequality fork= 1 
corresponds to a Rawlsian social welfare fnction, and fork= n corresponds to 
the Hicksian compensation criterion. But for a general social welfare 
function, the inequality has to hold for all k to ensure dominance. Of 
course, the ranking is not independent of the base price vector pO, and this 
serious limitation has to be kept in mind in interpreting the results. 
Another welfare indicator that we use is the average energy intakes (kcals 
per capita per day). 
5.A. Alternative Public Distribution Policies 
Three public distribution scenarios are compared wiLh Lhe reference 
scenario. In scenario DPO, at one extreme, the distribution system including 
domestic procurement is abolished. FRFD-lOOW, at the other extreme, provides 
100 kg of wheat per year to all consumers, urban as well as rural, with the 
cost being financed by increasing income taxes (largely borne by the two 
richest classes of urban consumers). Policy FRFD-lOOW-X is the same as 
FRFD-100-W except that the subsidy is financed by reducing investment. The 
results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. All policy changes relative to the 
reference scenario are introduced in 1980. 
The implications of the simulations presented in Tables 2 and 3 are clear. 
The aggregate impact of alternative public distribution in terms of GDP 
growth, average energy intake per capita per day etc are modest. For example, 
between the extremes DPO and FRFD-lOOW, real GDP in year 2000 differs only by 
about 10%. On the other hand, the distributional consequences differ 
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substantially between policies. The massive redistribution scenario FRFD-l00W 
of supplying 100 kgs. of wheat free of cost to all, financed by additional 
taxation results in a substantial reduction by 60% in the poorest population 
in rural areas from the reference value of 164 million (31.6% of rural 
population) in 1980. The reduction is by 39% from 148 million (20.5% of rural 
population) in 2000. The reduction in the number of urban poorest is 
numerically considerably smaller since there are fewer urban poorest but 
proportionately more impressive than the rural reduction. The other extreme, 
DPO which abolishes the public distribution system that operates in urban 
areas only in the reference run, has negligible impact on the rural poorest 
but, as expected, increases the population in the poorest class in urban areas 
significantly. The growth consequences of financing a free food policy by 
reductions in investment are marginal (i.e. less than 10% fall in real GDP 
over a 20-year period). However poverty reduction is virtually the same as 
compared to financing by additional taxation. In any case, a social welfare 
measure based on equivalent incomes that incorporates aversion to regressive 
income transfers shows that a free food policy improves social welfare in a 
modest way (see Figure 1). In an apparent paradox the abolition of the public 
distribution system reduces real GDP growth slightly. The paradox is only 
apparent--it is a consequence of the fact that in the reference scenario the 
public distribution system generates more revenue through procurement tax than 
it spends on consumption subsidies in later years. This is because the model 
does not restrict procurement to equal what is distributed. 
It should be pointed out that in all the food subsidy scenarios the 
recipient of the food ration is assumed to be able to sell a part or the whole 
of the ration as he sees fit at open market prices. Thus the subsidy on the 
food ration is equivalent to an income subsidy of equivalent value at open 
market prices. We also examined the consequences of the polar opposite 
assumption of the impossibility of open market sale. This meant that as long 
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as the ration is not free the very poor cannot afford to buy and consume their 
entire ration. They buy only what they can afford and the impact on their 
welfare of the ration is less than in the case where rations can be freely 
sold. 
The above analysis assumes that the extension of the public distribution 
system to rural areas does not involve any additional costs, i.e. the unit 
cost of the distribution system does not depend either on its scale in terms 
of the volume of grains procured and distributed nor on its geographical 
coverage. If there are economies (diseconomies) of scale or scope the unit 
cost will fall (rise) as the system is extended. Without any robust empirical 
evidence it is hard to decide on this issue. In any case our results are 
based on assuming that unit costs do not change. While it is true that our 
model postulates a fairly high incremental capital output ratio (IGOR), it is 
kept the same in policy and reference scenarios. As such the growth 
consequence of alternative policies expressed as a percentage change from the 
reference scenarios are not affected by the high IGOR. 
5.B. Rural Work Programmes 
A more complete discussion of the rationale for Rural Works Programmes 
(RWP) and detailed simulation results are presented in Narayana et al (1988). 
We assume that only the two poorest expenditure classes are the target groups 
to be covered under RWP. An average quantity of 100 kgs of foodgrains per 
year are distributed to the participants as wages. However, the per capita 
quantity distributed to the poorer of the two classes is fixed at 125 kg so 
that the quantity r2 received by the next poorest class is given by 
r2 = (lOOp - 125p1)/p2 where p, Pl, P2 are respectively the population of 
the two classes together, of class 1 and of class 2. The value of r2 varies 
between scenarios because of variation in p, Pl and P2· 
Various inefficiencies and leakages do occur in RWP. Analytically these 
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can be viewed as of two types. The first one relates to the productivity of 
the assets created under RWP relative to that of non RWP investment in the 
economy. The second one relates to a failure of targeting--the benefits 
intended for the target groups leaking to non-target groups. 
In our model the inefficiencies of the first kind are introduced through 
an efficiency ~arameter e (which takes three values 1.0, 0.5 and 0.0) 
representing the ratio of the productivity of RWP created assets relative to 
economy-wide average return to investment. Clearly e = 1 represents a 
well-designed and executed RWP, while e = 0 represents an RWP with which is 
completely infructuous as investment but is simply a transfer. Targeting 
efficiency is represented by a parameter t (taking two values 1.0 and 0.5) 
representing the proportion of RWP wage bill that accrues to the target groups 
in rural areas. We present the simulation results in Table 4. A scenario is 
characterized by its (t,e) combination and the mode of financing of its cost, 
namely, whether it is through additional taxation or by reduction in 
investment. Thus a free foo<l sc.en~rio in which 40 kg of wheat is distributed 
free to all is also considered and financed by reduction in investment. This 
costs roughly the same as the RWP. This scenario is denoted as FF40X. 
It is seen from Table 4 that in a well designed, executed and targeted 
RWP, not only the rural poor improve their welfare substantially but the 
economy grows slightly faster (because of the additional investment through 
rural works) as well, provided the resources needed for the RWP are raised 
through additional taxation. However the additional tax effort needed 
initially is substantial--in 1980 an additional 6% of GDP has to be raised as 
income taxes over the reference run value of 2% but with the economy growing, 
additional tax effort required declines substantially and by the year 2000 
reduces to around 1% of GDP with the reference run value being 7%. As such, 
if foreign aid in the form of grants are available for a limited period, 
poverty alleviation through RWP can be initiated without straining the fiscal 
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capacity of the government. If foreign aid is not available and taxes cannot 
be raised, an RWP financed through a reduction in investment reduced real GDP 
in year 2000 by a marginal 4.6% relative to the reference run while it was 
higher by 3.5% in the scenario with tax financed RWP. Thus the sacrifice in 
growth is modest, while the favourable impact on the welfare of the poor is 
unchanged. Further social welfare comparison using the Bailey-Willig 
criterion shows (Figure 2) that such an RWP dominates a free food policy that 
costs just as much. Finally, if the investment component of RWP is completely 
infructuous, and 50% leakage occurs, the welfare of the poor is roughly halved 
compared to a well designed, executed and targeted RWP also financed by 
taxation. 
5.C The Abolition of the Fertiliser Subsidy 
It was pointed out earlier that farmers receive a subsidy of roughly 30% 
on the price of the fertilisers they use. We examine below the consequences 
of abolishing the subsidy from 1989 onwards and use the resources used for 
financing the subsidy in three alternative ways; (i) augment aggregate 
investment (scenario NS), (ii) use part of the released resources for 
financing a RWP that distributes 20 kg of wheat per capita per .year as wages 
to the two poorest rural classes, with t and e parameters both set at 0.5. 
The remaining part of the released resources is used for augmenting aggregate 
investment. This scenario is denoted as NS-RW20, (iii) use part of the 
released resources to create an additional 2 million hectares of irrigated 
area per year over the reference run. The remaining part is used to augment 
aggregate investment. This scenario is denoted by NS-IR+ 2M. The simulation 
results of this section are based on a slightly updated version of the model 
of the earlier sections in which some parameters have been reestimated with 
data up to 1984. As such the reference scenario results for these simulations 
differ from those for the simulations of sections 4A and 4B although the 
policies remain the same. Further policy changes are introduced in 1989.The 
results are presented in Table 5. 
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Increasing aggregate investment instead of subsidising the use of 
fertilisers (as in the reference scenario) increases real GDP by a negligible 
1% and reduces the output of foodgrains by about 4% in year 2000. The 
proportion of the rural population in the poorest class increases by 4% in 
1990 as well as 2000. The urban pooor are unaffected. Using part of the 
resources saved from the abolition of the fertiliser subsidy on rural works 
and the rest on additional.investment improves the real income of the poorest 
in rural areas while leaving GDP, foodgrains output and urban popr unchanged 
as compared to investing all of it. On the other hand, creating additional 
irrigated area of 2 million hectares per year with part of the resources and 
using the rest for increasing investment increases real GDP by 9%, fertiliser 
use by 5% and foodgrains output by 12% all in year 2000 compared to the 
reference scenario in the continuing fertiliser subsidy. The proportion of 
the rural population in the poorest rural class falls by about 1.5%. What 
this suggests is that augmenting irrigated area, rather than subsidizing the 
use of fertiliser, achieves not only increased use of fertiliser but has 
beneficial impact on the rural poor. Compared to the scenario in which there 
is no fertiliser subsidy, the changes in poverty or in macro aggregates 
associated with the other three scenarios in Table 5 are very small. In other 
words untargeted and indirect poverty alleviation policies cannot be expected 
to make much of a dent on poverty. 
6. Conclusions 
We considered three broad sets of policies for alleviating rural poverty 
and hunger, namely, an untargeted policy of subsidizing part of the food 
consumption of the entire population including the poor, a targeted policy of 
providing additional employment opportunities for the rural poor through a 
rural works programme (RWP) and an indirect policy of subsidizing fertilizer 
or alternatively increasing the area irrigated both of which augment the 
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production of food. It would appear that a well designed, executed and 
targeted RWP has the greatest impact on the poor. Thus, compared to a free 
food programme that provides 40 kgs of grain to all that raises the energy 
intake of the poorest (two poorest) class in rural areas by 11% (10%), an RWP 
of comparable cost raises it by 70% (40%) over its reference run value. The 
increase in equivalent income is 11% (10%) in the case of free food and 67% 
(39%) in the case of RWP. This is seen by comparing scenario RWl00-1-1 and 
FF40X in Table 3. The indirect poverty allevition policies of subsidizing 
fertilisers or augmenting irrigation as expected have only modest impacts. It 
would appear that the potential of employment generation in poverty 
alleviation has been understood by policy makers. The introduction recently 
of the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, an employment programme that consolidates and 
expands preexisting programmes, is an indicator of this fact. 
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Table 1 
Food and Fertilizer Subsidies in 






























Impact of Alternative Procurement and Distribution Systems 
on Selected Macro Economic Indicators 
Absolute Percent Change over 
Values Reference scenario 
DPO FRFD-l00W FRFD-l00W-X 
Variable Year Reference no pro­ Free food Free food 
scenario curement to all; to all; 
no dis­ Tax rate Tax rate 
tribution adjusted fixed 
GDP totala 1980 530.0 0 0 0 
2000 1429.0 -0.07 0. 72 -9.36 
GDP agriculturea 1980 220.0 0 0 0 
2000 354.0 0 0.47 -2.50 
GDP non-agriculturea 1980 310.0 0 0 0 
2000 1075.0 -0.09 0.81 -11. 62 
Total investmenta 1980 110.0 0 0 -16. 71 
2000 492.0 0 1.19 -18.46 
Tax rate(%) 1980 2.3 39.0 486.9 160.87C 
2000 9.8 11.2 19.39 0 
Price index of 
agriculture over 












GDP per capitab 1980 786.0 0 0 0 
2000 1363 .0 -0.07 0.72 -9.36 
Food energy 
intake 1980 2162 0.42 3.63 5.42 
(Kcal/person/day) 2000 2569.0 0.45 1.59 -1.18 
Average equivalent 1980 544.0 0 -0.44 3.43 
Expenditurec 2000 661.0 -0.18 0.46 -2.82 
a109 Rupees at 1970 prices. 
bRupees at 1970 prices. 
CExpenditure needed at 1970 prices to provide same utility as 
provided by current consumption at current prices. 
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Table 3 
Impact on the Poorest Class of Alternative Public 
Distribution Policies 
Poorest Class with Annual Per Capita 
Equivalent Expenditure of less 
than Rs.216 
Itemsa Absolute Percentage Change Over 
Values Reference Scenario 
REF DPO FRFD-lOOW FRFX-lOOW 
Rural 1980 
Population 0.316 0.00 -60.32 -60.44 
Equivalent Expenditure 129.0 1. 32 15.49 14.18 
Energy Intake 981.0 1. 33 14.78 13.15 
Urban 
Population 0.019 52.63 -89.47 -89.47 
Equivalent Expenditure 165.0 -1.03 -7.95 -9.65 
Energy Intake 1085.0 -1.11 -9. 77 -11. 80 
Rural 2000 
Population 0.205 1.46 -38.54 -34.15 
Equivalent Expenditure 133.0 2.64 15.51 15.59 
Energy Intake 1059.0 2.08 15.20 13. 22 
Urban 2000 
Population 0.004 75.00 -50.00 -25.00 
Equivalent Expenditure 172.0 -1. 51 -0.29 -0.87 
Energy Intake 1252.0 -2.64 -1.92 -4.95 
aunits: Population - proportion of total rural or urban population. 
Equivalent - Rupees per cpaita with 1970-71 prices as reference 
Expenditure prices. 
Energy - Kcal per person per day (as reflected in the data of 
Intake household's expenditure--excludes consumption provided 
by employer at place of work). 
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Table 4 
Impact on Growth and Rural Poor of Rural Works Programs 




Scenarios GDP70 Difference Class Classes 
per in GDP 70 Avr 
capita growth rate EQY/ Cal/ EQY/ ENY/ EQY/ 
1980-2000 Ca:g Ca:g Ca:g Ca:g Ca:g 
With additional 
Taxation: 
RWl00-1-1 3.5 0.22 2.2 5.7 67 70 39 
With fixed 
tax rates: 
RWl00-1-lX -4.6 -0.25 -0.2 4.7 67 70 39 
RW100-1-.5X -8.5 -0.47 -2.6 3.8 67 70 39 
RWl00-1-0X -13. 2 -0.73 -5.4 2.6 67 70 39 
RWl00-.5-lX -3.7 -0.20 0 3.0 33 40 19 
RWl00- .5- .5X -7.3 -0.40 -2.0 2.1 33 40 19 
RWl00-. 5-0X -11. 8 -0.66 -4.7 1.0 33 40 19 
FF40X -4.2 -0.23 -0.8 1. 3 11 11 10 
GDP70 Gross domestic product at 1970-71 prices. 
EQY Equivalent Expenditure; ENY: Energy Intake (kcals per day) 
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Table 5 
Impact of Alternative Input Subsidy Schemes 
GDP 70 (10**9 1970 Rs) 
GDP Agr* 70 (10**9 
1970 Rs) 
Fertilizer use (10**3N) 
Total irrigated area 
(10**6 hectares) 
Wheat (10**6 tonnes) 
Rice (10**6 tonnes) 






RURAL POOREST CLASS 
Proportion of rural 
population 
Equivalent Expenditure 
URBAN POOREST CLASS 
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